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question of unreasonable or improper purpose is placed upon the corporation objecting to the inspection.
MAUMC

S. CULP

CRIMINAL LAW
Substantive Crimes
Ohio cases relating to substantive crimes dealt with embezzlement,
false imprisonment, false pretenses and larceny by trick.
An embezzlement case, Motors InsuranceCorp. v. Robinson,' considered
the application of the rule that a demand upon the defendant is required in
order to establish embezzlement. The court of appeals reaffirmed the principle that when money comes into the hands of the defendant lawfully, it
is necessary for the state to prove that a demand for a return was made and
refused.
A common pleas court 2 in an action for damages for false imprisonment interpreted Ohio General Code Section 11754 which exempts females
from arrest on mesne or final process for any debt or claim arising upon a
contract. The court by way of dictum declared that the exemption did not
apply to arrest for contempt of court which resulted from the plaintiff's
failure to appear for questioning as a judgment debtor.3
In construing Section 710-176 of the Ohio General Code in a prosecution predicated on the issuance of checks with intent to defraud, the court
of appeals in State v. Stemen 4 stated that a reasonable expectation on the part
of the drawer that the bank will honor his checks when presented for payment constitutes a good defense. The court in affirming the defendant's
conviction held that where the drawer of the check in question had drawn
checks previously with knowledge that they would clear the bank and deplete the account before the check in question could be presented for payment, an inference of "intent to defraud" arises.
The supreme court in State v Healy5 considered for the first time Ohio
General Code Section 12447-1 which defines "larceny by trick." The court
of appeals had construed the larceny by trick statute as a mere supplement
'106 N.E.2d 581 (Ohio App. 1951), appeal dismtssed, 157 Ohio St. 354, 105
For a further discussion of the case see INSURANcE article,
N.E.2d 61 (1952)

rnfra.
'Morton v. Murphy Lumber & Hardware Co., 102 N.E.2d 744 (Summit Com. P.
1951)
'Id. at 745.
'90 Ohio App. 309, 106 N.E.2d 662 (1951), cert. dened, 342 U.S. 949, 72 Sup.
Ct. 564 (1952)
' 156 Ohio St. 229, 102 N.E.2d 233 (1951).
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to the general larceny statute, and thus required that a specific intent on
the part of the accused be shown as an element of the crime. In reversing
the court of appeals, the supreme court held that proof of a general intent
to do the proscribed act is sufficient under Section 12447-1. It declared that
the statute defining the offense is silent on the question of intent and thereby indicated the legislative purpose to make proof of a specific intent unnecessary. This latter view seems derived from the design and purpose of
the Section which is to protect the innocent from ingemous fraudulent
schemes.
JurisdictionalProblems
Of the cases considering jurisdictional problems, a great number have
arisen by way of habeas corpus actions. In State ex rel Scott v. Alvzs" the
supreme court held that a three judge trial court has jurisdiction, upon a
plea of guilty by an accused charged with unlawfully and purposely killing
another while in the perpetration of a robbery, to determine the degree of
the offense and to sentence the accused, even though no written waiver of
trial by jury is filed as provided for by Section 13442-4.
In Harrts v. Alvss7 a fifteen year old minor pleaded guilty in the court
of common pleas to the crime of robbery. After he reached his majority, the
defendant sought his release from the prison on the grounds that the original
action should have been brought in juvenile court. The court of appeals
stated that a minor had the right to have the action transferred to the juvenile court's jurisdiction. However, the court held that the juvenile court does
not have exclusive jurisdiction over a criminal case in which a juvenile is
defendant and by pleading guilty the minor had effected a valid waiver of
his transfer right.
Another facet of the jurisdictional problem in criminal proceedings
concerned the extent of the authority of a justice of the peace. A court of
common pleas" declared that prosecution for statutory violations of orders
and regulations of a county board of health was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace under Sections 4414, 4416 and 4418-10
of the Ohio General Code. However, the authority of the justice of the
peace was successfully attacked in the case of In re Lockhart.0 The supreme
court held in a habeas corpus proceeding that under Section 13433-9 of the
Ohio General Code where a person charged with a misdemeanor is brought
before a justice of the peace on a complaint not made by the injured party
and the defendant pleads guilty, the justice can only require the accused to
6156 Ohio St. 387, 102 N.E.2d 845 (1951)

7 104 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio App. 1950)
"State v. Gottfried, 106 N.E.2d 675 (Senaca Com. PI. 1952).
6157 Ohio St. 192, 105 N.E.2d 35 (1952).
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post bond to appear before the proper court. In such a situation, the justice
does not have the statutory authority to render a judgment against the accused or to cause him to be imprisoned.
The well-settled rule that, although the writ of habeas corpus will be
properly issued against a judgment or order which is wholly void, it cannot
be used as a substitute for an appeal was followed in several 1952 decisions.
Thus the writ was unsuccessful where there were alleged defects in the
form of the indictment,' ° and also where there were allegations of error in
the sentencing of the defendant." Furthermore, it was not available as a
substitute for an appeal from a finding that the defendant was a psycho2
pathic offender.1
Revocation of Parole
Three cases dealt with the problems growing out of the revocation of
parole or probation. In State ex rel. Newman v. Lowery,"3 the petitioner
sought an order to compel the Pardon and Parole Commission to reinstate
its order granting a "parole to the petitioner to begin at a future date."
Drawing on the analogy of the power of courts to set aside and vacate an
order made during term, the court concluded that the commission, when it
has made an order granting a parole effective at a future date, has the discretionary power to enter an order of rescission provided that it becomes effective prior to the actual release of a prisoner.
The court of appeals in LDma v. Beer'4 questioned the validity of a trial
court's order revoking a suspension of sentence. In overruling the remcarceration order, the court referred to the broad power of the trial court in
sentencing a person for a misdemeanor to remit or suspend the sentence
upon such terms as it may impose. However, where the sentence was suspended and conditions were imposed, the defendant had a right to rely upon
them, and there could be no revocation of the suspension except upon evidence of a violation of the conditions. Such proof of violation required
a judicial inquiry upon the part of the court, and the defendant was entitled to a hearing, to know the name of his accuser and to be able to have
a complete cross-examination of the witnesses against him.
In a similar case, the court of appeals in State v. Nowak'5 pointed out
that the statutes of Ohio outline a detailed procedure for probation revocation, and therefore the defendant is not entitled to a formal trial although
" In re Stewart, 156 Ohio St. 521, 103 N.E.2d 551 (1952).
' Weber v. Alvis, 89 Ohio App. 533, 103 N.E.2d 42 (1951); Giordano v. Amrine,
92 Ohio App. 349, 104 N.E.2d 457 (1952)
"Stewart v. Alvis, 90 Ohio App. 377, 104 N.E.2d 596 (1950)
' 104 N.E.2d 590 (Ohio App. 1951)
' 90 Ohio App. 524, 107 N.E.2d 253 (1950)
"91 Ohio App. 401, 108 N.E.2d 377 (1952).

19531

SURVEY OF OHIO LAW-

1952

he is entitled to a judicial inquiry in order to determine the grounds upon
which the previous order of probation is to be vacated. This judicial inquiry contemplates a public hearing in open court after timely notice, the
right of defendant to be present with counsel, the right to an opportunity to
be heard and the right to submit evidence in his own behalf. The court
found that in this specific case the law had been compied with and that
there was no abuse of discretion.
Extradition
The one reported decision, In re Acton,' dealing with extradition reemphasizes several important propositions established by the Ohio courts.
Thus, where the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding attacks the warrant of extradition, the issue before the court is whether the affidavit upon
which extradition is sought charges the commission of an offense punishable
in the demanding state. Also, the sufficiency of the affidavit for extradition is to be tested by the laws of the state; and evidence tendered by the
petitioner to show a defense to the crime charged is not admissible since
the court is not determining the defendant's culpability.
Municipal Law Enforcement
Toledo v. Schudel considered the statute of limitations applicable to the
Toledo ordinance making it a misdemeanor to fail to pay the Toledo payroll tax. No statute of limitations had been created by the ordinance. The
court of appeals held that the statute of limitations of the state applied, and,
under Ohio General Code Sections 4562 and 12381, the action was barred.
Arrest
The interpretation of Ohio General Code Section 13432-1 which establishes the right of an officer to arrest and detain a person found violating a
municipal ordinance was raised in State v. Marshall.18 A traffic violation
allegedly occurred in the City of Piqua and the arrest took place in the
City of Rossville. The court took the position that the arrest was proper
since it was coupled with "fresh and immediate pursut." In so holding,
it stated that the statute places no territorial limitations upon peace officers,
other than constables, as long as the arrest takes place within the State of
Ohio.
Indictments
The sufficiency of criminal indictments is always an important and
sometimes a troublesome issue. In Campfield v. State' the court of ap"90 Ohio App. 100, 103 N.E.2d 577 (1949).
190 Ohio App. 55, 103 N.E.2d 287 (1951).
105 N.E2d 891 (Piqua Mun. Ct. 1952).
"91 Ohio App. 74, 105 N.E.2d 661 (1950).
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peals considered the question of whether the filing of a complete bill of
particulars can cure an indictment which failed to charge any offense. It
held that the indictment itself must charge the offense and, therefore, the
bill of particulars was insufficient.
Admissibility of Evidence
One of the leading cases on criminal law reported in 1952 is State v.
Yadick2" which considered the effect of the admission of evidence directed
to a defective charge in an indictment. The court held that where the indictment contained several charges, one of which was defective, the trial
court erred in admitting prejudicial evidence supporting the defective
charge when such evidence was not competent as to the proper charges.
Another case involving the proceedings at trial, related to the method
of treating incompetent evidence which has been presented to the jury. In
State v. Zidak21 the court of appeals determined that the trial court properly
instructed the jury that testimony with regard to an unrelated previous crime
be stricken from the record and be totally disregarded by them, and that this
instruction was sufficient to cure the defect in the absence of a showing to
the contrary.
An interesting question was presented in State v. Hamm 2 2 as to whether
the accused can be cross-examined concerning a prior conviction under a
city ordinance punishing an act which is also an offense under a state statuteY3 In construing Ohio General Code Section 13444-2 which authorizes
the showing of a conviction for an offense for the purpose of affecting the
credibility of the witness, the court of common pleas concluded that such
evidence is competent where the ordinance punishes an act which is also
proscribed as an offense under the state statutes.
A related problem confronted a court of appeals in State v. Ross."
Among other things, the court considered an exception to the rule that the
state may not prove crimes not alleged in an indictment as aiding the proof
of the crime charged. On the basis of general law and Ohio General Code
Section 13444-19, the court stated that evidence of the prior crime may be
permitted if it tends to prove: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of
mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one
tends to establish the other; or (5) the identity of the person charged with
' 158 Ohio St. 23, 106 N.E.2d 769 (1952)
'91 Ohio App. 464, 108 N.E.2d 834 (1951)
104 N.E.2d 88 (Hamilton Com. Pl. 1952)

='The offense was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. OHIo GEN.
§ 6296-30.
"92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E.2d 77 (1952).
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